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A SYMPOSIUM ON TRADE REGULATION
AND PRACTICES
PART I*
COMMERCIAL RESTRICTIONS IN ENGLISH LAW
EDWARD A. MORRISON**

With the passing of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956,1 the
English statute book is now furnished with a set of enactments, comprising this Act and the Monopolies Acts 1948 and 1953,2 which are
comparable to the anti-trust legislation of the United States. The
English statutes present marked dissimilarities to their American
counterparts both in aim and method. In order to understand them it
is necessary to consider certain divergences of emphasis on the part
of English and American judges on the common law rules in which the
legislation of the two countries alike is embedded, and certain aspects
of the English commercial structure which have resulted from the
judicial development of this branch of the law in England.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-PUBLIC POLICY

The doctrine that contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade are
unenforceable or void is a fundamental conception common both to
the American and to the English jurisprudence. An English judge
would readily adopt the percipient opinion of Justice Taft, when he
says: 3

But where the sole object of both parties in making the contract as
expressed therein is merely to restrain competition, and enhance or maintain prices, it would seem that there was nothing to justify or excuse the
restraint, that it would necessarily have a tendency to monopoly, and
* This symposium is to be published in two sections. The second section
will appear in Vol. 11, No. 2, March, 1958.
** Barrister-at-law, Middle Temple, London, England.
1. 4 & 5 ELiz., c. 68.
2. Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948,
11 & 12 GEO. 6, c. 66; Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission Act,
1953, 1 & 2 Euz. 2, c. 51. Both of these have been amended by the Act of 1956.
3. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898).
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therefore would be void. In such a case there is no measure of what is
necessary to the protection of either party, except the vague and varying
opinion of judges as to how much, on principles of political economy, men
ought to be allowed to restrain competition. There is in such contracts
no main lawful purpose, to subserve which partial restraint is permitted,
and by which its reasonableness is measured....
So Lord Birkenhead has declared in unequivocal terms: "[A] cov'4
enantee is not entitled to be protected against competition per se."
A distinguished chancery judge remarked succinctly: "[T]here cannot
be a covenant in gross in restraint of trade ....

-5 For these reasons a

contract between two Canadian breweries was held to be void by the
Privy Council whereby they undertook for consideration to abstain
from competition in certain branches of the trade, notwithstanding
that the transaction was cloaked by the sale of rights afforded by
6
license.
Whether or not such contracts are enforceable cannot be divorced,
in either jurisprudence, from "public policy."
"Public policy requires that every man shall be at liberty to work
for himself, and shall not be at liberty to deprive himself or the state
'7
of his labour, skill, or talent, by any contract that he enters into."
In the famous case of Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and
Ammunition Co., 8 on the other hand, which is still a locus classicus for
the law on this subject, Lord Watson says:
I think it is now generally conceded that it is to the advantage of the
public to allow a trader who has established a lucrative business to dispose of it to a successor by whom it may be efficiently carried on. That
object could not be accomplished if, upon the score of public policy, 'the
law reserved to the seller an absolute and indefeasible right to start a
rival concern the day after he sold.
But a marked divergence becomes apparent, although not so much
in doctrine as in emphasis, in the application of the rule as soon as one
considers the very peculiar and limited position of "public policy" in
the English exposition of the law. In particular, English judges have
stedfastly refused to identify "public policy" with any economic theory
or phenomenon.
The English judicial mind, for example, would recoil from the enthusiastic utterance of the Kentucky judge when he said: 9
4. McEllistrim v. Baliymacelligott Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy
Society, [1919] A. C. 548, 564.
5. Townsend v. Jarman, [1900] 2 Ch. 698, 702, per Farwell, J.
6. Vancouver Malt and Sake Brewing Co. v. Vancouver Breweries, Ltd.,
[1934] A.C. 181 (P.C.).
7. Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L.R. 9 Eq. 345, 352 (1869) quoted with
approval by Lord Atkinson in Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, [1916] 1
A.C. 688, 700-01.
8. [1894] A.C. 535, 552.

9. Anderson v. Jett, 89 Ky. 375, 12 S.W. 670, 671 (1889).
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Rivalry is the life of trade. The thrift and welfare of the people depend
upon it. Monopoly is opposed to it, all along the line. The accumulation
of wealth out of the sweat of honest toilers by means of combinations is
opposed to competitive trade and enterprise. That public policy that encourages fair dealing, honest thrift, and enterprise among all the citizens
of the commonwealth, and is opposed to monopolies and combinations,
because unfriendly to such thrift and enterprise, declares all combinations
whose object is to destroy or impede free competition between the several
lines of business engaged in utterly void.
The guarded language of a Victorian chief justice of the Common
Pleas is in marked contrast when he states the rule in the following
terms. "At common law every person has individually, and the public also have collectively, a right to require that the course of trade
should be kept free from unreasonable obstruction."'10
In no decided case has an English judge sought to extend the doctrine
beyond these narrow limits. The important case, for example, of
Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia v. Adelaide
Steamship Co. 1 turns on the interpretation of the Privy Council of
an Australian statute resembling in some respects the Sherman Act
and other anti-trust legislation of the United States, which provided
in effect that a person should be guilty of an offence who should enter
into a contract "with intent to restrict trade or commerce to the
12
detriment of the public.'
The contract in issue was one for exclusive dealing between four
shipping companies and certain colliery proprietors. The court refused to adopt the view, strenuously argued by counsel for the Crown,
that any contract which is unenforceable at common law, or any arrangement in restraint of trade or commerce which, if embodied in a
contract, would be unenforceable at common law, must be detrimental
to the public.
The "public" is by no means to be identified with the "consuming
public." Lord Parker says: 13
[I]n considering the interests of consumers it is impossible to disregard the
interests of those who are engaged in . . .production and distribution.
It can never be in the interests of the consumers that any article of consumption should cease to be produced and distributed, as it certainly would
be unless those engaged in its production or distribution obtained a fair
remuneration for the capital employed and the labour expended.
Numerous agreements to maintain prices have been upheld by the
10. ERLE, THE LAw RELATING TO TRADE UMiONS (1867). This statement of
the law has been adopted in numerous decided cases.
11. [1913] A.C. 781 (P.C.); cf. North Western Salt Co. v. Electrolytic Alkali
Co., [1914] A.C. 461.
12. The Australian Industries Preservation Act, 1906, S.4(1) (a) and (b).
See Attorney-General of the Commonwealth v. Adelaide Steamship Co.,
[1913] A.C. 771, 782.
13. [1913] A.C. at 801.
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courts. In Palmolive Company (of England), Ltd. v. Freedman,14 for
example, the defendants, who were wholesalers, signed an agreement
providing that they would sell Palmolive preparations only to customers approved by the Palmolive Company and that they would
maintain prices in accordance with the Company's list. Shortly
afterwards the defendant, finding that many shops were selling Palmolive soap at below the list price, declined to be bound by the agreement. The plaintiffs therefore claimed and obtained an injunction
restraining the defendant from selling the Company's products at
below the list prices.
So far as the public interest is concerned, "slight evidence-if any,"
says Lord Hanworth, "is needed to justify an agreement for the
maintenance of prices."'15 Lawrence, L. J. (now Lord Oaksey) remarks: 16
Without wishing to cast any reflection on the doubtless excellent quality
of those preparations I do not think that the English public would have
any reasonable ground of complaint if none of them were sold in this
country at all, much less if none of them were sold by the defendant or
were only sold by him at high or even excessive prices.
That an arrangement entered into by responsible men of affairs
should be "contrary to public policy" is a proposition which, if only
for its vagueness, English judges will not readily entertain. Public
policy, in the racy language of a judge of the Regency period, "is a very
unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where
it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never
argued at all but when other points fail.' 7
In the more sedate language of Lord Watson in the Nordenfelt case: 18
A series of decisions based upon public policy, however eminent the
judges by whom they were delivered, cannot possess the same binding
authority as decisions which deal with and formulate principles which
are purely legal. The course of policy pursued by any country in relation
to, and for promoting the interests of, its commerce must, as time advances and as its commerce thrives, undergo change and development from
various causes which are altogether independent of the action of its
Courts. In England, at least, it is beyond the jurisdiction of her tribunals
to mould and stereotype national policy.
"Public policy," moreover, is distinct from "government policy."
"What one government approves its predecessor or successor may
condemn, and, if the suggestion were acted on" [that government approval was evidence of public policy] "precisely the same contract
14.
15.
16.
17.

[1928] Ch.264.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 281.
Per Burrough, J. in Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep.

294, 303 (C.P. 1824).

18. [18943 A.C. at 553.
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might have to be held void when government A was in and valid
when government B was in power."'19
But, in any event, foremost among the principles of public policy
on which the courts invariably insist is that the subjects of the Queen
should fulfill the obligations imposed upon them by the contracts into
which they have freely entered.
20
That eminent master of the law, Sir George Jessel, has said:
[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it
is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into
freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts
of justice.
Freedom such as this would be nugatory in the eyes of English
judges if it did not impart the right of combination among businessmen. "The right of the individual to carry on his trade or business in
the manner he considers best in his own interests involves the right
of combining with others in a common course of action .... -21
THE INTEREST TO BE PROTECTED

It is now time to forsake "public policy" and to turn to "the sound
law"; to attempt to formulate "the principles purely legal" governing
business contracts alleged to be in restraint of trade. The problem is
to discover, in Justice Taft's apt phrase, the "measure of what is neces''
sary to the protection of either party."
Where restrictive covenants are entered into on the sale of a business, the reasonableness of the restriction is measured by what is
necessary to ensure that the purchaser of the good-will receives what
he bargained for; in a contract whereby an employee restricts the
conditions of his employment on its termination, by what is necessary
to protect the confidential matter vested in the employer. Where the
employee has no access to confidential matter or secret processes, a
restrictive covenant will not be upheld.2
In contracts between businessmen regulating prices or the terms on
which they carry on their trades, English courts have recognized
that "stability," "such reasonable stability of relationship as a careful
19. Monkland v. Jack Barclay, Ltd., [1951] 1 All E. R. 714, 723 (C.A.), per
Asquith, L. J.
20. Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465
(1875); cf. English Hop Growers, Ltd. v. Dering, [1928] 2 K.B. 174, 180-81,
per Scrutton, L.J.
21. Attorney-General of the Commonwealth v. Adelaide Steamship Co.,
[1913] A.C. 781, 797.
22. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 283 (6th Cir.
1898).
23. Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, [1916] 1 A.C. 688.
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merchant is content with,"'' is an interest which they may legitimately
seek to protect and provides a yardstick by which to assess the
reasonableness of the covenants entered into by the parties.
So, for example, in English Hop Growers, Ltd. v. Dering2 the plaintiff society, which was formed for the purpose of organizing the
marketing of homegrown hops, successfully enforced a contract allegedly in restraint of trade against one of its members. Scrutton, L. J.
says:
In view of the fluctuating character of the yearly supply of hops, I see
nothing unreasonable in hop growers combining to secure a steady and
profitable price, by eliminating competition amongst themselves, and
putting the marketing in the hands of one agent, with full power to fix
prices and hold up supplies... 26
In the McEllistrim case, 27 on the other hand, the agreement in issue
provided that the members of the society, on pain of forfeiting their
shares, were obliged to sell all the milk produced by them to other
members of the society and to them alone. No time limit was fixed
for the duration of the agreement. The contract was avoided by the
House of Lords partly because the covenants were more stringent
than was reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the parties,
and partly because it was held that its essential purpose was the
stifling'of competition.
It is possible, in sum, to deduce with some confidence from the decided English cases the following propositions, the implications of
which, insofar as they affect ordinary business relations, will be immediately apparent.
First, that contracts in restraint of trade would
be void if shown to be contrary to public policy is still a part of the
law of England. 28 But although there are many decisions which have
had the effect of avoiding such a contract because it was unreasonable
in the interests of one of the parties, there is no recorded decision
where the sole ground has been that the contract was injurious to the
public.29 It is not possible to equate "public policy" with any particular economic theory or even with the "public interest" at a phase
of the national development.
24. McEllistrim v. Ballymacelligott Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy
Society, [1919] A.C. 548, 564, per Lord Birkenhead.
25. [1928] 2 K.B. 174; cf. British Motor Trade Ass'n v. Gilbert, [1951]
2 All E. R. 641 (Ch.).
26. [1928] 2 K.B. at 181.

27. McEllistrim v. Ballymacelligott Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy
Society, [1919] A.C. 548; cf. Joseph Evans & Co. v. Heathcote, [1918J 1 K.B.
418.
28. [1919] A.C. at 563.
29. [1913] A.C. at 795. In Neville v. Dominion of Canada News Co., [1915]
3 K.B. 556, which concerned a covenant by a newspaper to refrain from commenting on the affairs of a land company "restraint of trade" and "public
policy" appear to have been treated by the court of appeal as distinct grounds
for avoiding the contract.
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The English courts are far more insistent, second, because of public
policy, on the inviolability of contracts freely entered into. Such freedom includes the right to combine in furtherance of the interests of
the parties. 0
Third, stability of business relationship is an interest which parties
may lawfully seek to protect, notwithstanding that the practices
adopted may result in increased prices or necessitate exclusive dealing.
Fourth, contracts between businessmen may be avoided on the
grounds that they are in restraint of trade only if the covenants are
shown to be manifestly oppressive or more stringent than is necessary
for the protection of the interests of the parties.
By reason of the operation of the foregoing principles, parties to
business combinations in England, whether or not the material agreements are embodied in the rules of a trade association, will avoid
their obligations only with difficulty. It is now pertinent to consider
whether the doctrine of restraint of trade will afford any assistance in
the law of tort to outsiders who may be injured by the activities of
trade combinations.
CoInWmRcIAL CoNSPIRACY Amc KmDRED WRONG
Some very eminent judges, in approaching this problem, have held
in effect that the common-law principle that trade should be free
from unreasonable restraint conferred a right of action on persons
injured by reason of a restraint that was unreasonable. Lord Esher
adopted this view in an elaborate and fascinating judgment in the
famous Mogul Steamship Company case 31 when it was before the Court
of Appeal.
Again, Lord Ashbourne in his dissenting judgment in an equally
celebrated case, Allen v. Flood, 2 held that the injured parties had
"[A] clear right to pursue their lawful calling, to have the full benefit
of their employment, and the right to enjoy the legitimate, reasonable, and probable expectation of a continuance of their employment. 2' 3 A wilful invasion of this right, in his view, constituted an actionable wrong.
But this branch of the law, which is of recent growth, has developed
along other lines. The remedies which English courts will afford when
an individual sustains damage from the business activities of others,
spring, not from the principles of restraint of trade, but from three
grounds of action which, because they are nearly related must be
distinguished with care. They may conveniently be denominated as
30. [1913] A.C. at 797.
31. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 605 (C.A
1889), aff'd, [1892] A.C. 25.
32. [1898] A.C. 1.

33. Id. at 112.
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follows: (1) procuring a breach of contract; (2) intimidation; (3)
civil conspiracy.
PROCURING A BREACH OF CONTRACT

In England, as in most jurisdictions of the United States, "[I]ntentionally and without lawful justification to induce or procure any one
to break a contract made by him with another is a tort actionable at
the suit of that other if damage has resulted to him."34
Since the law in both countries, deriving from the Victorian case of
Lumley v. Gye,35 has grown along very similar lines, it is proposed to
mention only two English cases which illustrate its latter-day development.
The first of these is The British Motor Trade Ass'n v. Salvadori.?
In the years immediately after the War, when motor cars were in short
supply, the normal purchaser was obliged to enter into a covenant with
the retailer that he would not resell the car within one year of the
date of purchase. Since all British motor-car manufacturers and their
authorized dealers were members of the plaintiff Association, it was
not possible legitimately to obtain a new car otherwise than under the
terms of the covenant. The defendants were either not members of
the Association or else were named on a "stop list" as being persons
with whom the members of the Association were forbidden to trade.
In order to obtain new or practically new cars for resale at inflated
prices, the defendants, who formed a ring, adopted the device of putting up an ostensible purchaser who signed the covenant and took
delivery of the car. He was provided with sufficient funds to pay for
the car and to reward himself, and handed over the car to a member
of the ring.
The plaintiffs claimed an injunction and damages mainly on the
ground that the defendants had procured a breach of contract.
The defendants contended that it is no tort merely to make a price
with a man who is offering a car for sale in breach of covenant, because
a willing seller needs no inducement.
Roxburgh, J., however, after an acute analysis of previous cases,
decided as follows. He said:
[I]n my judgment, any active step taken by a defendant having knowledge

of the covenant by which he facilitates a breach of that covenant is
enough. If this be so, a defendant by agreeing to buy, paying for and
taking delivery of a motor-car known by him to be on offer in breach of
covenant, takes active steps by which he facilitates a breach of covenant
....The plaintiffs will succeed even if I have construed the word "interference" too broadly, because even if a further element of inducement
must be present, that further element can be found.37
34. SALMOND, TORTS 408 (11th Ed. 1953).
35. 2 El. & 1.216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
36. [1949] 1 Ch. 556.
37. Id. at 565-66.
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With this case must be contrasted the case of D. C. Thomson & Co.
v. Deakin,38 in which employers of labour unsuccessfully sought to
restrain the officers of a trade union from inducing lorry drivers,
employed by the suppliers of goods to the plaintiffs, to refrain from
delivering goods to them. The action of the lorry drivers resulted in
a breach of contract between the plaintiffs and their suppliers.
The Court of Appeal held that there must be some act "amounting
to a direct invasion" by the third party of the rights of one of the
parties to the contract.
Jenkins, L. J., epitomises the dicta of the learned Lords Justices
when he says: "[A]cts of a third party lawful in themselves do not
constitute an actionable interference with contractual rights merely
because they bring about a breach of contract, even if they were done
with the object and intention of bringing about such a breach. '39
The pronouncements contained in the last-named case must be
considered as the concluded statements on this branch of the English
law.
INTIMIDATION
Where a breach of contract has been procured by a third party,
liability attaches both to the third party and to the party in breach
of the agreement. The rules of law applied in England are perhaps
more stringent than those laid down by American courts where the
person in immediate contractual relation with the plaintiff is not himself liable though a third party induces him to determine lawfully
an existing contract or to abstain from future dealing.
In Temperton v. Russell,40 a case which has not been without influence on American decisions, Lord Esher stated unequivocally that it
was an untenable distinction "[T]o say that, where a defendant maliciously induces a person not to carry out a contract already made
with the plaintiff and so injures the plaintiff, it is actionable, but where
he injures the plaintiff by maliciously preventing a person from
entering into a contract with the plaintiff, which he would otherwise
have entered into, it is not actionable."'41
But this part of Lord Esher's judgment has been disapproved by
the House of Lords. 42 It is now clearly established that no action will
lie under these circumstances unless the plaintiff can show that the
procurement has been brought about by means that are unlawful,
such as force,43 or a threat based on a complete and deliberate fabrication,44 and that in the result he has suffered damage.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

[1952] 1 Ch. 646.
Id. at 693.
[1893] 1 Q.B. 715.
Id. at 728.
See Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. 1, 94, 108, 114, 149.
Tarleton v. McGawley, Peake 270, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (N.P. 1793).
Conway v. Wade, [1909] A.C. 506.
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The reasoning that runs through the numerous English cases turning
on what means are unlawful does not differ materially from the
principles with which American lawyers will be familiar. Where the
intended means, for example, are lawful, such as the withdrawal of
labour, the threat to employ them cannot be unlawful,45 and some
ingenuity has been expended in the attempt to distinguish between a
"threat" and a "warning."46 Acts or utterances do not become unlawful
because they present such an irresistible inducement as to amount to
what is sometimes called coercion if they are not unlawful for any
other reason.
But the doctrine has been applied in two English decisions which
may surprise those who are familiar only with the American jurisprudence and which have particular importance for the aspect of the
subject with which this article deals.
In the first of these, Ware & De Freville v. Motor Trade Ass'n 4 7 the
plaintiffs were a firm of motor dealers whose names were published by
the defendants in a "stop list" of persons with whom other members
of the Association would refuse to deal. The main object of the machinery of the "stop list" was to force dealers to buy and sell only at
prices and on conditions determined 'by the Association. Publication
of the plaintiffs' names in the list was an "irresistible inducement" to
other traders to refrain from entering into business relations with the
plaintiffs. But the defendant-Association was animated only by a legitimate desire to protect its own members and the means to which it
resorted in so doing were untainted with illegality. The plaintiffs
accordingly failed to set at naught the Association's decision.
In Thorne v. Motor Trade Ass'n,48 the House of Lords carried the
matter even further when they upheld the Association's practice of
imposing a fine on an offending party as an alternative to publishing
his name in the "stop list."
It was suggested that the argument in the Ware & De Freville case,
relied on in the Thorne case, was equally applicable to the operations
of the common blackmailer, who does no more than to intimate that
he intends to do what he has a perfect right to do, namely, to communicate particulars of some compromising conduct to a person whose
knowledge is likely to affect the party threatened. But the learned
lords made the ingenious distinction between the threat, which is
lawful, and the demand for money, which may or may not be justified
according as it is made with or without reasonable cause.
Lord Atkin said:
45.
46.
47.
48.

White v. Riley, [1921] 1 Ch.1.
Santen v. Busnach, 29 T.L.R. 214 (C.A. 1913).
[1921] 3 K.B. 40.
[1937] A.C. 797.
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It appears to me that if a man may lawfully, in the furtherance of
business interests, do acts which will seriously injure another in his
business he may also lawfully, if he is still acting in furtherance of his
business interests, offer that other to accept a sum of money as an alternative to doing the injurious acts. He must no doubt be acting not for the
mere purpose of putting money in his pocket, but for some legitimate
purpose other than the mere acquisition of money ....
It is obvious that
a reasonable construction of the . . . [Association's] rules leads to the

inference that the intention is to deter persons in the trade from violating
recognized conventions as to maintaining list prices and the like: to give
the Council power to preclude all traders from commerce with the
offender: but to allow the Council to mitigate the grave penalty of "Stop
List" by substituting a money payment and an undertaking not to offend
again. If the Council bona fide exercised this power with the bona fide
intention only of carrying out this trade policy, in my opinion they would
not be demanding the payment without reasonable and probable cause. 49
CIVIx CONSPRACY
It remains to consider the peculiar position occupied in the English
law of tort by the action for civil conspiracy and whether it affords a
remedy to a person who has suffered damage as a result of the acts of
a combination of persons.
It is questionable, notwithstanding a dissenting opinion of Holmes,
J., which will be mentioned below, whether any American decision
declares in terms that an action lies at the suit of an individual who
has suffered damage as a result of the acts of a combination of persons
when the act if done by one person would not constitute a tort.
In England this branch of the law was clouded in darkness until it
was illuminated in 1925 by the judgments delivered in the House of
Lords in Sorrell v. Smith.50 These were elaborated in a second important case, CrQfter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch.5 1
The classic definition of the tort of conspiracy is to be found in Lord
Cave's judgment in the Sorrell case. He says:
(1) A combination of two or more persons wilfully to injure a man in
his trade is unlawful and, if it results in damage to him, is actionable.
(2) If the real purpose of the combination is, not to injure another, but
to forward or defend the trade of those who enter into it, then no wrong
is committed and no action will lie, although damage to another ensues.52
This bears a marked resemblance to the lucid and compendious dissenting exposition delivered by Holmes, J. in 1896 in the case of
Vegelahn v. Guntner.53 He said:
[W]hen a plaintiff proves that several persons have combined and
conspired to injure his business, and have done acts producing that effect,
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 807.
[1925] A.C. 700.
[1942] A.C. 435.
[1925] A.C. at 712.
167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
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he shows temporal damage and a cause of action, unless the facts disclose,
54
or the defendants prove, some ground of excuse or justification.

It is apparent that, notwithstanding the general rule that motive is
immaterial to tort,55 intention is common to both definitions. English
lawyers have made numerous and ingenious attempts to whittle away
the psychological element, but it is perhaps best to recognize that this
cause of action is an anomaly.
It is, at all events, tenuous. Because of the difficulty of proving intent, in only five cases reported since the beginning of this century
have plaintiffs succeeded who relied on this cause of action alone.56
Of these, four concerned disputes between working men. The reasoning in the fifth, Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n,57 has not been approved
by the House of Lords.
NEGATIVE CONCLUSIONS

It is therefore clear that the modern trade combination enjoys solid
foundations in the principles of English law. A party to it cannot avoid
his obligations on the ground that they are in restraint of trade unless they are manifestly oppressive as in Evans & Co. v. Heathcote 58
or in the McEllistrim case.59 English judges will not arrogate to themselves either the right or the duty to declare that the economic consequences of certain types of contract must be contrary to public policy
or the public interest.
On the other hand, a person outside the combination who is injured
by its practices will succeed in an action for damages only if he can
prove the procurement of the breach of a valid and subsisting contract;
or the resort to methods which may broadly be termed "grossly
illegal" in dissuading others from trading with him; or the element of
intent necessitated by the dubieties of the action for civil conspiracy.
In addition, if the parties to the combination are also members of a
trade association they will almost certainly enjoy the immunity from
suit in tort which is the privilege of trade unions, whether unions of
employees or of employers.6
THE MODERN BRITISH TRADE ASSOCIATION

It is, indeed, remarkable that although much labour has been expended in apologies for the union of employees, the association of
54. 167 Mass. at 105.
55. See particularly Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. 1.
56. Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495; Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n,
[1919] 1 K.B. 244; Giblan v. National Amalgamated Labourers' Union, [1903]
2 K.B. 600 (but as to this, see the Crofter case, [1942] A.C. at 475); Valentine
v. Hyde, [1919] 2 Ch. 129; Huntley v. Thornton, [1957] 1 Weekly L.R. 321.
57. [1919] 1 K.B. 244.
58. Joseph Evans & Co. v. Heathcote, [1918] 1 K.B. 418.
59. McEllIstrim v. Ballymacelligott Co-operative Agricultural and Dairy
Society, [1919] A.C. 548.
60. Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 EDW. 7, c. 47, § 4.
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manufacturers or of distribution has hitherto largely escaped the
attentions of the sociologist. It is, nevertheless, a normal feature of
the contemporary economic scene in England. There are, perhaps,
1000 of them in existence, of which between 150 and 200 are registered
as companies.
They have grown up during the last seventy years or so in response
to a number of demands. Negotiation between industrialists and government departments or workpeople would scarcely be possible without them. In addition they provide facilities in some cases for research
and development, for the exchange of information and for the expansion and conservation of markets at home and overseas.
The aspect of their activities which is pertinent to the present article, however, is the control of prices. It is a matter deeply embedded
in the branch of the law that is now under consideration.
It has been apparent from the McEllistrim case and similar cases
that stability in the productive and distributive process is an interest
which a trader may lawfully seek to protect. In this behalf a manufacturer may lawfully determine the prices above or below which his
products shall not be sold on the retail market. Such a term in a
contract with his distributor is enforceable by action against one who
sells in breach like any other contractual obligation. But when the
manufacturer has sought to enforce such a term against a third party
deriving title, not from him but from the distributor, he has been confronted, until the passing of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, by
insurmountable obstacles presented both by common law and by
statute.
Although it is beyond dispute that, in equity, restrictive covenants
attaching to the sale of land may, under certain circumstances, "run
with the land" so as to bind subsequent purchasers for value who
have notice of the covenant, no similar rule applies in the case of the
sale of unpatented chattels.
This principle was established beyond dispute by the House of
Lords in the famous case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Seifridge
& Co.61 In this action the plaintiffs marketed their tires through a
distributing organization of which a firm called Dew & Co. were
members. Dew & Co. obtained a title to the goods that they purchased
from the plaintiffs. By a contract which was independent of the contract of sale, they convenanted not to resell Dunlop tires at prices
below the list prices current at the time of sale. The consideration for
this covenant moving from the plaintiffs was the allowance of a trade
discount.
Dew & Co. resold the tires to the defendants, a retail store, who
61. [1915] A.C. 847. See also Taddy & Co. v. Sterious & Co., [1904] 1 Ch.

354; McGruther v. Pitcher, [1904] 2 Ch. 306.
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subscribed to a contract with Dew & Co. containing a similar consideration and similar covenants. But Selfridge's sold tires to two customers
at prices below those fixed by Dunlop's list.
In trying to enforce the covenant against Selfridge's the plaintiffs
were confronted with an immediate dilemma. If Dew & Co. obtained
title to the tires as principals, there was no contract at all between
the parties to the action on which the plaintiffs could sue. But even if,
on the other hand, Dew & Co. were Dunlop's agents so that the plaintiffs could sue as undisclosed principals, no consideration emanated
from them so as to enure for the benefit of Selfridge's.
Since the ingenuity of counsel was unable to resolve these difficulties, the action failed.
If manufacturers form themselves into an association for the purpose
of maintaining prices by judicial means, they are confronted with a
statutory bar to relief at law. Such an association becomes a "trade
union," which, by English law, does not owe its existence to any statutory or other formality, but comes into being, like a partnership,
62
whenever a particular set of circumstances arises.
The courts are inhibited, however, from entertaining legal proceedings instituted with the object of enforcing agreements, such as price
maintenance agreements, which are fundamental to the purposes of
the union. 63 Equally, however, such agreements are not unlawful
merely because they are in restraint of trade.64
For these reasons businessmen who have wished to set up systems
of price control have resorted to extra-judicial means of enforcing
their contracts.
In some associations manufacturer members were required to sell
goods only through dealer members, and dealer members were required to buy only from manufacturer members. Expulsion from the
association afforded the ultimate sanction,65 and a severe one, for its
enforcement might drive an offender out of business.
The commonest method, however, has hitherto been to publish the
name of the recalcitrant party in a "stop list" of persons to whom other
members will refuse to supply goods; or else the imposition of a fine
as an alternative.
So in the well-known instance of the British Motor Trade Association all motor manufacturers incorporate in their contracts with
dealers and distributors a clause requiring them to be members of
the Association. The rules of the Association, which include the
62. See the Trade Union Act Amendment Act, 1876, 39 & 40 VIcT., c. 22, § 16.
63. The Trade Union Act, 1871, 34 & 35 VICT., c. 31, § 4.
64. Id. § 3.
65. E.g., the Association of Dental Manufacturers and Traders of the U.K.
See the Report of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, Cmd.
9504 (1953).
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procedure-to be followed on breach, are accordingly a part of the
contract of sale, with the result that a breach of a rule of the Association is a breach of the agreement.
In order that offenders may not be punished unjustly many associations embody in their scheme of organization a court or tribunal,
usually presided over by a person having legal qualifications, which
is empowered by rules to make findings of fact after hearing evidence
adduced much as in a court of law, and to visit appropriate penalties
on recalcitrant parties.
The circumstances in which courts of law will interfere with the
findings of domestic tribunals such as these are beyond the scope of
this article. 66 Such an arrangement has, however, obtained the fullest
judicial sanction in cases which have already been considered, namely,
Ware & De Freville, Ltd. v. Motor Trade Ass'n 67 and Thorne v. Motor
Trade Ass'n.68 It has, moreover, been adopted bodily by Parliament.
For most agricultural products are now sold in England under marketing schemes which provide that dealings may be made only through
registered dealers and on terms prescribed by a marketing board.
A "disciplinary committee" has, in some instances, the power of imposing penalties on persons who contravene the decisions of the
board. 69

THE RESnucTIVE TRADE PRAcTIcES ACT, 1956
Antecedents
The depression of the "thirties" produced in the United States under
the "New Deal" violent attacks on all forms of restraint or monopoly
in industry and commerce. In England, on the contrary, "rationalisation" became the fashion and agreements between competitors, often
sponsored by the government, for the maintenance of prices, for exclusive or discriminatory dealing and for restrictions in other forms,
have been widely entered into during the last quarter of a century.
With the economic advantages or disadvantages of such restrictions
this article has nothing to, do. I have endeavoured to set out their legal
foundations. Since 1920 four Royal Commissions7 0 have sat to consider
the general impact of such practices on the economy, as well as
several committees which have discussed their incidence in particular
trades.
66. For recent decisions see Lee v. Showmen's Guild of Great Britain, [1952]
1 All E.R. 1175 (C.A.); Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, [1956] A.C. 104.
67. [1937] A.C. 797. See also British Motor Trade Ass'n v. Salvadori, [1949]
1 All E.R. 208 (Ch.); British Motor Trade Ass'n v. Gilbert, [1951] 2 All E.R.
641 (Ch.).
68. [1921] 3 K.B. 40 (C.A.).

69. See the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1933, 23 & 24 GEO. 5, c. 31.
70. The last of these was The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission 1955, of which the findings are published in Cmd. 9504. The findings of the
three earlier commissions are summarized in appendix I of this publication.
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The reports of these Commissions have revealed a gradual hardening of opinion against the now existing restrictions, and they have
resulted in two distinct bodies of legislation, first, the Monoplies Acts
and, second, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956.
The Monopolies Acts
The object of the Monopolies Acts, 71 as amended by the Act of 1956,
is primarily to inquire into conditions tending to monopoly on the
part of one or a limited number of persons engaged in the supply of
goods in the United Kingdom, the application of any process to goods
within the United Kingdom, or the export of goods from the United
Kingdom. For this purpose the Acts set up a Commission, now known
as "The Monopolies Commission," to whom references may be made by
the Board of Trade. The first duty of the Commission is to investigate
and report. In addition, however, it may make specific recommendations for remedying the mischiefs revealed in their finding.
About twenty reports have hitherto been published by the Commission.7 2
The recommendations may be as to action to be taken by the parties
themselves, put forward either by the Commission or by the appropriate Minister. For example, the members of the Electric Lamp
Manufacturer's Association have recently announced its dissolution
because of a report of the Commission advocating substantial changes
in their system of distribution. The findings of the Commission enjoyed the formal approval of the Ministry of Supply.
In the alternative the Commission may recommend action to be
taken by a government department or by the legislature.
In either case, where a report of the Commission finds that conditions prevail or things are done which are contrary to the public
interest, after the report has been laid before Parliament, a "competent authority," i.e., one of nine specified government departments,
may declare the arrangement to be unlawful in whole or in part and
require the parties to terminate it. So far only one class of agreements
has been declared to be unlawful, namely, those containing restrictions
or discriminations in the supply of dental goods. 73
It is expressly provided that criminal proceedings shall not be taken
for the contravention of such an order. 74 But the Crown may enforce
71. M oDopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948,
11 & 12 GEo. 6, c. 66; Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission Act,
1953, 1 & 2 ELiz. 2, c. 51.

72. Most, though not all, of these are summarized in ALBERY AND FLETCHER-

COOKE, MoNoPoriss AND RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES (London 1956).

73. Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Dental Goods) Order S.1, No.

1200 (1951).

74. Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948,

11 & 12 GEO. 6, c. 66, §§ 10, 20(1).
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it by civil proceedings for an injunction, and a suit will lie at the
instance of an individual injured as a result of its infringement.
The Restrictive Trade PracticesAct-The Machinery
Far more important for its legal consequences, however, than the
Monopolies Acts is the statute which came into operation at the beginning of this year, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956. 75
It brings into existence two engines for giving effect to its intentions,
namely, the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements and the
Restrictive Practices Court.
The duties of the Registrar are to compile and maintain a register
of agreements which are subject to registration and to represent the
Crown, either as applicant or respondent, in proceedings taken before
the Restrictive Practices Court or the High Court.
It is estimated that about 1,400 agreements are now listed in the
Register.
The Restrictive Practices Court is composed of four puisne judges,
under the Presidency of Mr. Justice Devlin, and eight lay members,
each one being "a person appearing to the Lord Chancellor to be
qualified by virtue of his knowledge of or experience in industry,
commerce or public affairs. ' 76 The Court has jurisdiction to determine,
in accordance with the terms of the Act, which agreements brought
before it by the Registrar are contrary to the public interest and to
take steps to abrogate those which are so found. The first proceedings
before the Court will be heard in the near future.
Registration
Four essentials must exist in order to make an agreement registerable.
Consensus: First, in order to constitute a registerable agreement
there must be a consensus of two or more persons. "Consensus," however, is given the widest possible construction. Section 6 (3) provides
that "'agreement' includes any agreement or arrangement, whether
or not it is or is intended to be enforceable . . . by legal proceedings. .. ." It is expressly applied to "any agreement made by a trade
association as if the agreement were made between... all persons who
are members of the association or are represented thereon by such
members. '77 Where "recommendations" are made by a trade
association to its members, moreover, as to action to be taken in regard
to the matters which characterise registerable restrictions, the Act
applies to the agreement for the constitution of the association as if
75. 4 &5 ELiz., c. 68.
76. Id. § 4(1).
77. Id. § 6(6).
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it contained a term by which each member agreed to comply with
8
these recommendations.7
The degree of assent necessary must be for the courts to determine.
It remains to be seen whether a doctrine will be developed resembling
the "conscious parallelism" of the American cases. This problem is
likely to be tested in the not too distant future since the Birmingham
City Council has forwarded to the Registrar particulars of some
thirty-eight cases of identical tenders by firms for municipal contracts.
Parties:In order that an agreement may be subject to registration,
second, it is not sufficient that a restriction be accepted by one party
only. There must be an acceptance by at least two parties of one or
more of the specified restrictions.
"Restriction" includes any negative obligation, whether express or
implied.7 9 But plainly a positive term in a contract may impart a
negative obligation. Where a manufacturer, for example, agrees to
sell only to a particular dealer or group of dealers, there is an implied
term that he will not sell to other dealers.
An agreement, moreover, which confers benefits only upon parties
who comply with conditions as to any of the specified matters, or
imposes obligations on parties who do not comply with them, shall be
treated as an agreement under which restrictions are accepted by each
of the parties in respect of those matters. 80
Where a restriction is accepted on the part of an association, the
Act applies as if the restriction were accepted by each of its members. 81
The Restrictions: Space permits only to mention the five kinds of
covenants enumerated in section 6 (1) which are essential to the registerable agreement. Restrictions must be accepted by two or more
parties in respect of the following matters:
(I) the prices to be charged, quoted or paid for goods supplied,
offered or acquired, or for the application of any process of manufacture to goods;
(II) the terms or conditions on or subject to which goods are to be
supplied or acquired or any such process is to be applied to goods;
(III) the quantities or descriptions of goods to be produced, supplied
or acquired;
(IV) the processes of manufacture to be applied to any goods, or
the quantities or descriptions of goods to which any process is to be
applied; or
(V) the persons or classes of persons to, for or from whom, or the
areas or places in or from which, goods are to be supplied or acquired,
or any such process applied.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. § 6(7).
Id.§6(3).
Id. § 6 (4).
Id. § 6(6).
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The Parties:Finally the agreement must be "between two or more
82
persons carrying on business within the United Kingdom."
"Persons," however, includes not only individuals and corporations
but also partnerships and "two or more persons being inter-connected
83
bodies corporate."
It follows that arrangements made between individuals carrying on
business in partnership or between a parent company and its subsidiaries are exempt from registration. But two companies cannot
evade the provisions of the statute by forming a partnership.
The two persons, moreover, must carry on bsuiness "within the
United Kingdom." What amounts to "carrying on a business within
the United Kingdom" on the part of a company whose principal office
is abroad must be for the Court to decide. The Act itself excludes from
its provision persons who are merely represented in the United Kingdom by an agent.84 A considerable body of law has grown around this
problem not only in connection with income tax but also in relation
to the service of judicial process. It is probable that the test to be
applied will be two-fold, namely: the carrying on of business for a
substantial period of time in England; and the carrying on of such
business through a representative having a fixed place of business
although he has no independent business of his own.
Excepted Agreements
Twelve types of agreement are expressly excepted from registration.85 Of these seven are covered by other statutory provisions, such
as the agricultural marketing boards mentioned above, and the
remainder are involved in arrangements which are not contrary to
the policy of the Act.
Three only will be mentioned specifically.
The effect, first, of a somewhat complicated formula to be found in
section 7 (2) is to exempt from registration the ordinary commercial
contract for the supply of specific goods provided, on the one hand,
that the parties to the contract do not both trade at the same commercial level, i.e., are not both manufacturers or both wholesalers; and,
on the other, that the restrictions accepted relate solely to the goods
which are the subject of the contract. So, for example, contracts containing covenants for the maintenance of resale prices of the kind
which were in issue in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co.86
would not be subject to registration. But a term providing for exclu82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. § 6(1).
Id.§ 8(9).
Id.§ 36 (3).
Id. §§ 7, 8.
[1915] A.C. 847.
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sive dealing could not be disregarded because this would not relate
"exclusively to the goods supplied."
87
The Act does not apply, second, to the sole agency agreement,
where, for example, a manufacturer appoints a particular dealer to
distribute his goods in a given area.
The agreement must, however, be confined to, two persons neither
of whom is a trade association; and it must relate to goods of the
same description as the goods supplied or acquired. What constitutes
"goods of the same description" will require judicial determination.
Agreements which relate to foreign trade "exclusively" are, third,
in general exempt from registration. Section 8 (8) provides that the
Act shall not apply to an agreement in which all the specified restrictions relate exclusively to:
(I) the supply of goods by export from the United Kingdom;
(II) the production of goods, or the application of any process of
manufacture to goods, outside the United Kingdom;
(III) the acquisition of goods to be delivered outside the United
Kingdom and not imported into the United Kingdom for entry for
home use;
(IV) to the supply of goods to be delivered outside the United
Kingdom otherwise than by export from the United Kingdom.
There is an important limitation on this exception, however, in that
particulars of agreements of the first class must be furnished to the
Board of Trade. 88 If there is any doubt as to whether a particular
agreement is subject to registration, the Registrar or any party may
apply to the High Court-not, be it noted, the Restrictive Practices
Court-for a declaration. One such application, relating to sole agency
agreements of the Austin Motor Company, has been determined. 89
Sanctions
Default in registration entails grave consequences to the parties,
although these fall short of criminal proceedings.
Where default is made in furnishing particulars, section 18 empowers the High Court to take one or more of three several courses.
(I) It may make an order authorizing the Registrar to treat as
particulars duly furnished any document or information relating to
the agreement which is already in his possession. He may thereupon
apply to the Restrictive Practices Court to determine whether the
agreement is contrary to the public interest.
(II) It may order any person party to the agreement to furnish the
necessary particulars. Failure to obey the order would amount to a
contempt of court.
87. 4 & 5 Euiz. 2, c. 68, § 8(3).
88. Id. § 31(1).
89. Re Austin Motor Co. Ltd.'s Agreements, [1957] 3 All E.R. 62 (Ch.).
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(III) If the Court is satisfied that failure to supply the particulars is
"wilful" it may make any order available to the Restrictive Practices
Court to nullify the effects of the agreement as if it had been found
to be contrary to the public interest.
Further wide powers are conferred on the Registrar to assist him in
obtaining information.
If he has "reasonable cause to believe" that either a person carrying
on business in the United Kingdom or a trade association is a party
to an agreement subject to registration, he may give notice to that
person or association requiring either of them to state whether or not
he is a party to such an agreement and, if so, to furnish the necessary
particulars. 90
Further, where particulars have already been furnished the Registrar may give notice to any person who has supplied them requiring
him to furnish any other document or information of which he is
possessed as the Registrar considers expedient for the purposes of
registration.
The phrases "reasonable cause to believe" and "as the Registrar
considers expedient" plainly invest the Registrar with a wide discretion. The demand for miscellaneous documents and information is
likely to be the more onerous in practice. "Expediency" is limited to
the purposes of registration. The person examined under oath may
be obliged to answer only "such questions as the court may put or
allow to be put to him."91 He would therefore enjoy a considerable
measure of protection if he refused to disclose information on the
ground that it was not necessary for registration.
The sanction of criminal proceedings, which may be instituted only
with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, is confined to
the following matters. 92
It is an offence:
(I) to fail to comply without reasonable excuse with a notice duly
given by the Registrar;
(II) if a person who furnishes a document or information knowingly or recklessly makes any statement or furnishes any document
which is false in a material particular;
(III) to continue in any default after conviction under the first head.
When an offence is committed by a body corporate, whether or not
formed for the purpose of carrying on an undertaking under national
ownership, an officer of the corporation may be held liable and punished personally.
90. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 14.
91. Id. § 15 (2) (b).
92. Id. § 16.
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The Public Interest
After an agreement has been registered, the parties may continue to
act on it until it has been brought before the Restrictive Practices
Court. The Registrar initiates this process in order that the Court
may determine whether or not it is "contrary to the public interest"
and make such order as may be appropriate for its termination or
abrogation.
"Contrary to the public interest" is to be distinguished from "contrary to public policy." The latter phrase covers certain defined classes
of contract which the courts will not enlarge. The tests to determine
whether or not contracts embodying restrictions which require them
to be registered are prescribed by the Act.
Every such contract is presumed to be "contrary to the public interest" unless the party or parties relying on it can prove the contrary.
He will succeed in displacing the presumption only if he can satisfy
the Restrictive Practices Court of one or more of the following circumstances: 93
(I) that the restriction is reasonably necessary, having regard to the
character of the goods to which it applies, to protect the public
against injury (whether to persons or premises) in connection with
the consumption, installation or use of those goods;
(II) that the removal of the restriction would deny to the public
as purchasers, consumers or users of any goods other specific and
substantial benefits or advantages enjoyed or likely to be enjoyed by
them as such, whether by virtue of the restriction itself or of any
arrangements or operations resulting therefrom;
(III) that the restriction is reasonably necessary to counteract
measures taken by any one person not party to the agreement with a
view to preventing or restricting competition in or in relation to the
trade or business in which the persons party thereto are engaged;
(IV) that the restriction is reasonably necessary to enable the person party to the agreement to negotiate fair terms for the supply of
goods to, or the acquisition of goods from, any one person not party
thereto who controls a preponderant part of the trade or business of
acquiring or supplying such goods, or for the supply of goods to any
person not party to the agreement and not carrying on such a trade
or business who, either alone or in combination with any other such
person, controls a preponderant part of the market for such goods;
(V) that, having regard to the conditions actually obtaining or
reasonably foreseen at the time of the application, the removal of the
restriction would be likely to have a serious and persistent adverse
effect on the general level of employment in an area, or in areas taken
93. Id. § 21(1).
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together, in which a substantial proportion of the trade or industry to
which the agreement relates is situated;
(VI) that, having regard to the conditions actually obtaining or
reasonably foreseen at the time of the application, the removal of the
restriction would be likely to cause a reduction in the volume of earnings of the export business which is substantial either in relation to the
whole export business of the United Kingdom or in relation to
the whole business (including export business) of the said trade or
industry; or
(VII) that the restriction is reasonably required for purposes connected with the maintenance of any other restriction accepted by the
parties, whether under the same agreement or under any other agreement between them, being a restriction which is found by the Court
not to be contrary to the public interest upon grounds other than those
specified in this paragraph, or has been so found in previous proceedings before the Court.
The Court must be further satisfied that the restriction is not unreasonable having regard to the balance between those circumstances
and any detriment to the public or to persons interested in the goods
or consumers, purchasers, users or producers.
Powers of the Court
If the Court finds that an agreement is contrary to the public interest, it may adopt one or more of the following courses. 4
(I) If the parties give satisfactory undertakings, it need make no
order at all. The jurisdiction of the Court to make a declaration is expressed as a power rather than as a duty.
(II) It may declare the agreement to be void in respect of such
restrictions as are found to be contrary to the public interest.
(III) It may grant an injunction restraining the parties from giving
effect to the agreement, from making any similar agreement, or, in
the case of a trade association, from giving effect to any recommendation made in pursuance of its constitution.
(IV) If an agreement is made or varied after the commencement of
proceedings, the Court may make any such order either in respect of
the new agreement or the varied agreement or both.
(V) The Court has no power to order the payment of costs except
against a party "who is guilty of unreasonable delay, or in respect of
any improper, vexatious, prolix or unnecessary proceedings, or any
other unreasonable conduct." 95
The ExtrarJudicialMeasures of the Trade Association
The Act sensibly diminishes the operations of the machinery of the
94. Id. § 20.
95. Id. Schedule, para. 9.
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trade association. It does not, on the other hand, abolish them in
their entirety. Agreements and arrangements, that is to say, such
as those exemplified in Thorne v. The Motor Trade Ass'n 96 will henceforth be unlawful provided they are designed to have effect in a
vertical direction. There appears to be nothing to forbid the formation
of such contracts where their consequences are horizontal.
For example section 24 declares that it shall be unlawful for manufacturers to agree to withhold supplies from dealers and for dealers
to agree to withhold orders from suppliers as a means of enforcing
conditions as to price. It appears to be lawful, however, for suppliers,
on the one hand, and for dealers, on the other, to agree to discriminate
in their commercial transactions with persons of the same category.
Such agreements would require to be registered and, if brought before the Restrictive Trade Practices Court, would be held to be contrary to the public interest unless the parties relying on it could
prove one or more of the excepting circumstances specified in the
earlier part of the Act.
The Individual's Right of Action
If an individual suffers damage as a result of the prohibited undertakings, his chances of success in an action for conspiracy are enhanced
in a marked degree. The contracts in question are declared to be
unlawful in express terms. A party relying on them cannot, as in
Sorrell v. Smith,97 set up as a defence that they were entered into for
the purpose of protecting his legitimate trading interests. Even
though the end is lawful, the means employed are now unlawful. The
plaintiff, moreover, is absolved from the necessity of proving intent
to injure as the purpose of the alleged conspiracy.
Further assistance is afforded to the individual litigant by the provision of the Act which declares that defendants to an action brought
in reliance on the unlawfulness of the contract in question shall not
be permitted to rely on the statutory rule prohibiting action against
trade unions in tort.98
Enforcement of Price MaintenanceConditionsby JudicialProcess.
But although the Act comes near to abolishing the extra-judicial
means by which traders attempt to enforce conditions as to resale
prices, it does away with one of the chief causes which obliged them
to resort to these methods. The Act brings into existence an entirely
new cause of action.
It was apparent from such cases as Dunlop Pheumatic Tyre Co. v.
96. 4 &5 Erz. 2, c. 68, § 14.
97. [19253 A.C. 700.
98. 4 & 5 Euz. 2, c. 68 § 24(8).
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Seifridge & Co.99 that a manufacturer may not enforce a condition
as to resale prices against a dealer who sells in breach unless the dealer
was a party to the contract.
But section 25 (1) declares in unequivocal language:
Where goods are sold by a supplier subject to a condition as to the price
at which those goods may be resold, either generally or by or to a specified
class or person, that condition may, subject to the provisions of this section,
be enforced by the supplier against any person not party to the sale who
subsequently acquires the goods with notice of the condition as if he had
been a party thereto.
It will be observed that the only condition which will afford a
cause of action under this section is a condition as to price. "Price,"
on the other hand, includes the amount of discount which may be
allowed on the resale of goods; and the price which may be paid on
resale of goods for other goods taken by way of exchange, as where
a second-hand motor car is taken in part exchange for a new car.
Whether notice may be constructive or must be actual has been
argued before the High Court in County LaboratoriesLtd. v. J. Mindel,
Ltd.oO Harman, J. held that the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay'0 was
not applicable to chattels: notice must be express, "'Notice' in my
opinion means knowledge.' 02
This remarkable statute extends and enlarges the sphere of English
Law in a noteworthy degree. It -clearly resembles in some regards
American legislation, and the English courts, when interpreting its
decisions, will look with respect and interest to the American decided
cases. But in its intricate delineation of the covenants to be registered,
in its method of determining what arrangements are contrary to the
public interest, and in creating a fresh course of action it marks a
new departure in the law of both countries.
99. [1915] A.C. 847.
100. [1957] 1 All E.R. 806 (Ch.).
101. 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
102. [1957] 1 All E.R. at 808.

